Of Intractable Conflicts and Participatory GIS
Applications: the search for Consensus amidst Competing Claims and Institutional
Demands.
Abstract
This article reviews the discourse
about Geographic Information System’s potential as a tool for intervening in
disputes over access to natural resources. GIS is a planning tool with striking
analytical capabilities and a great public appeal that can be utilized for
explicitly reasoned discussions to facilitate conflict resolution. On the other
hand, the technology’s reputation as an interventionist tool has been
undermined by competing claims about factors that sustain conflicts. Some scholars
believe elements of a conflict are manageable and that meaningful communication
between disputants erase misconceptions and generate consensus. Others reject
cooperation and instead emphasize competition as the driving force behind
conflicts. This article investigates these claims and argues that both the
competitive push to claim independent rewards and the cooperative urge for the
creation of joint values are present in conflict resolution. The article
discusses the links between value systems, opinions and actions, and how a GIS
application might influence such human attributes to induce changes that
promote cooperation. The study concludes with a case study involving the use of
GIS to manage a conflict over natural resources allocation in a rural community
in
Key Words: Participatory GIS, conflict resolution, resource
management, values and interests,
Introduction:
Two theories are evident in current thinking about the role GIS plays in
conciliative attempts that occur in resource management organizations. On one
hand, Weber’s explanation of instrumental rational behavior and interpretations
of the theory dismiss
cooperative moves to resolve conflicts and instead, emphasize competition and
self-interest as the factors that sustain conflicts. Advocates of this
viewpoint maintain that the competitive urge to claim independent rewards compels
parties to adopt positions that are often difficult to reconcile. The
proponents therefore argue that when information about a conflict becomes
available, disputants will use it to confirm their existing positions. On the other
hand, Habermas’ communication theory
identifies social institutions, including norms and sanctions, as forces behind
conflict resolution. The viewpoint assumes that elements of a conflict are
malleable and that cooperation and meaningful communication between disputants
will erase misconceptions and induce mutual agreements. The theories
provide frameworks for understanding aspects of human behavior during a
conflict. Considered separately, the theories do not fully address all the factors
which motivate groups to prolong or resolve conflicts between them. The
theories fail to account for the fact that both the competitive and cooperative
forces are involved in a conflict. They do not also take the type of conflict into
consideration. For example, the theories fail to consider whether the conflict
occurs between groups within a sociopolitical system (where institutional
forces can restrain competition), or, whether the disagreement occurs between
groups affiliated with different sociopolitical systems that have very little
in common. Neither of the theories also account for changes that occur during
the lifetime of a conflict which may either facilitate or restrain competition
and cooperation. However, it is
becoming increasingly apparent that the resolution of conflicts is subject to
contextual forces that are both competitive and cooperative in nature (Raiffa 1982; Lax and Sabenius
1986; Sharfman and Gray 1991; Logson
1991). In spite of this, few
authors have addressed the combined impacts of these factors on the mediation
process. In particular, debates about GIS applications in mediation have ensued
from either the competitive or cooperative approach to conflict. Whilst the
competitive approach assumes irreconcilable antagonistic values and as such dismisses GIS applications, the cooperative
approach emphasizes mutual relationships and common interests and hence welcomes GIS applications for the cultivation
of shared interests. It is important to
note that innovative GIS applications can succeed in preparing disputants for
consensus in conflicts sustained by either values or interests. GIS
applications are however limited to issues that are distributed in space and
can be mapped and analyzed (i.e., land use). The technology’s role mediation is
therefore constrained more by the types of conflict (spatial or non-spatial) than
the nature of the disagreement (value or interest driven conflict).
This article argues
that in matters of conflict over land use, the cooperative and competitive
forces are present and intertwined. The study backs up arguments by Raiffa, (1982) and Lax and Sabenius
(1986, 2000) who view the mediation process as an effort to manage a tension
between the cooperative move to create values jointly and the competitive urge
to claim rewards independently. The article maintains that although the
competitive move to advance self-interest is present in conflicts over land
use, group expectations, sanctions and shared commitments are equally important
factors in conflict resolution and its prevention. The competitive and institutional forces aside, the article observes that
the formation of beliefs, (values and interests) that sustain a conflict
rests either upon information (that is available to an agent), or the
disagreement can result from misinformation and misunderstanding. It is
possible that in either of these situations, skilful and innovative
applications of GIS can help disputing parties get past initial misconceptions
and work together to create joint gains. The article concludes with a case
study in which GIS was adopted to manage conflicts arising from competition for
access to forest resources. The case study forms part of a larger research project
conducted in
The
recent upsurge in the implementation of Community-based GIS projects[1]
provides clues to how forces of technological change, advocacy, and public
expectation have reshaped the course of GIS development and the power relations
that have until recently defined its research and applications. As GIS has
continued to play an expanded role in the way we analyze spatial data, view,
and understand spatial phenomena, empowerment of underprivileged groups has
emerged as a new and popular field of GIS research and applications. The new
GIS initiative aims to develop a system that will be adaptable to inputs from
ordinary citizens and other non-official sources (Obermeyer, 1995). Under the
initiative, GIS applications have spread from large, public, and private
establishments in the West, into inner city neighborhoods and community-based
organizations throughout the world. To advocates and experts engaged in these
Participatory GIS (PGIS) applications, the
technology provides a critical complement to grassroots efforts that are
undertaken to empower communities (Craig and Elwood 1998, Ghose
2001; Craig et. al. 2002). On the other hand, the expanded involvement of groups
with little experience in the use of complex technologies (such as GIS) generated
a great deal of concern among GIS scholars. Prominent among the early misgivings
were; unequal access and the imbalances of power generated by GIS applications (Obermeyer
1991; Curry 1994; Aitken and Michel 1995). Some scholars argued that the technology’s primary
function of preparing data to facilitate decision-making identifies it more
with public officials and powerful members of society than it promotes the
interests of underprivileged groups (Johnson
1993; Curry 1994; Pickles 1995).
The critiques about equal
access to data and technology, public participation, and impacts of GIS
adoption on society were not only suggestive of problems with GIS applications,
but such reminders also highlighted the need to introduce the technology to
groups who would likely lose out in public policy debates that involved GIS
applications. In an early attempt to ensure a level playing field for GIS implementation,
Chrisman (1987) advocated for the development of a GIS that would facilitate
multi-cultural and cross-cultural applications. Other scholars argued in
support of expanded applications by claiming that the technology is socially
constructed and that GIS assumes its identity within specific social contexts
(Campbell 1994; Campbell and Masser 1995). The belief
is that the social and geographic location of a community provides its people
with a context through which they learn to use GIS technology, interpret, and
use information (Fox 1998; Warren 1995; Stuart 2002). The importance of the
social context in GIS development was amply illustrated recently in the book Community
Participation and Geographic Information Systems (Craig et. al. 2002). In
several chapters, authors demonstrated GIS applications across multiple axes of
difference. Thus, recent developments in community-based GIS applications undercut
the claim that GIS represents particular epistemologies and that local
knowledge cannot be translated into cartographic maps. Such arguments deny the
agency of advocates and experts who spearhead GIS applications (Chrisman 1999; Sieber
2000a; Kwan 2002). For some scholars, the lack of access to the technology was
viewed as limitation on the freedom of communities that had a good
understanding of their needs but could not verbalize their problems within a
context that included GIS (Bevan 1988; Metzendorf 1988). Accordingly, to ensure public participation
and equal access to information at a time of widespread computer usage, it
became necessary to address imbalances in access to GIS technology among some
of society’s most vulnerable groups (NCGIA 1996; Shroeder
1996; Craig et. al. 1998). Thus, propelled by popular advocacy, favorable
developments in the computer industry, and support from grant-awarding
organizations, the PGIS initiative has spread into several remote locations
worldwide.
The use of cartographic
representation to empower underprivileged groups and counter dominant
viewpoints about property regimes and land use practices is not new. PGIS
applications draw on participatory strategies and an intellectual tradition
that includes planning, social forestry and community development. Advocates
and other scholars have integrated a variety of mapping techniques with public
participatory methods to demonstrate conflicting sets of knowledge about local
geographic space and natural resource use (Kabutha
et. al. 1990; Chambers 1994; Peluso 1995; Ross 1995;
Poole 1995; Rocheleau 1995, 1997; Hogson
and Shroeder 2002;). Generally, the counter-mapping
projects are designed to represent the viewpoints of particular underprivileged
groups (Rocheleau et. al. 1995; Sieber
2000b; Kwan 2002), demarcate and protect indigenous land rights (Beltgens 1995; Smith 1995; Bond 2002), record and appraise
local knowledge (Neitschmann 1995; Laituri 2002) and assess local and neighborhood needs
(Elwood 2002; Ghose and Huxhold 2002; Sawicki and Burke 2002). Aside empowerment and provision of
alternative representations to counter official interpretations, community maps
have been employed as powerful communication tools to present information in
different ways to convey an impact on choice selections of individuals and
groups (Wood 1993; ; Fox 1994; Keates 1996; Craig and
Elwood 1998; Eghenter 2000; Kyem 2002). There is a
long history of the use of maps in direct and informed negotiations and in
promoting free expression and consensus building among community groups (Gupta
et al., 1989; Mascarenhaus and Kumar 1991; Neela 1992). Rocheleau (1995, 1997), along with other
advocates (Rocheleau et. al. 1995; Poole 1995; Krishna 1996; Huffman 1997),
associate feature categories in community maps with preferences and negotiated
compromises realized by the groups. As well, it is believed the mapping equips communities
with power to realize their priorities in cooperation or competition with other
groups. A GIS is by far a better tool for depicting and producing relations
among spatial entities (Berry 1993; Chrisman 1997), and a more “persuasive
tool” (Goodchild 1999, 3) than what one can achieve with ordinary maps. Consequently,
if creatively applied, the technology can do more to facilitate the resolution
of conflicts than ordinary maps. The mapping capability aside, GIS offers
opportunities for parties to jointly collect and analyze data, explore
alternative scenarios, create a medium for stakeholders to exchange views about
their values and interests, see results of value choices and learn to develop
trust for each other (Leidner and Elam 1995: Kyem
1997). Computer Information Systems are also known to create a level of
reputation about impartiality, enhance and increase participation in
discussions amongst groups (Belcher and Watson, 1993: Bergeron et. al. 1995:
Raymond et. al. 1995). The technology is closely linked to centers of power and
influence in society (Rockart and De Long 1988:
Watson et. al. 1991; Paese and Sniezek
1991). Besides, the data that a GIS expert produces, and the confidence that
stakeholders develop in such information, convey an increasing level of
influence to the expert. With the development of GIS therefore, community-based
organizations seem to have the right tool for structuring resource management
practice to open up the process, and make it iterative and less controversial
than before. Accordingly, as GIS adoption in communities grows in significance,
it is likely capabilities of the system will be challenged to address complex
problems resulting from competition for access to scarce local resources.
Notwithstanding the technology’s
capabilities and expectations about its potentials, GIS’s ability to facilitate
conflict management has been undermined by claims about irreconcilability of
human factors that sustain a conflict. The argument is that because of GIS’s
inability to affect value conflicts and its propensity to increase fact-based
conflicts (through the supply of data that can be used to support arguments),
conflicts would intensify and increase with expansion in GIS applications (Obermeyer
and Pinto 1994; Berry 1995). On the other hand, other GIS scholars believe the
technology can be adopted to manage competing claims to land-based resources. Capabilities
of the system have consequently been utilized in association with
multi-objective models, to create arrays of solutions to land use problems to
facilitate the resolution of land use conflicts (Armstrong et. al. 1986;
Diamond and Wright 1988; Carver 1991; Eastman et. al. 1993a; Kyem 2000). The
questions we need to ask in the light of widespread community-based GIS
applications include the following: are subjective human values amenable to
influence from a GIS application? Do GIS applications produce desirable changes
in interests and values that sustain a conflict? Can GIS be adopted to explore a
conflict condition and prepare disputants for the creation of joint values? There
are currently no agreed answers to these questions. However, the indeterminate
status of the technology’s role in the conflict mediation poses a challenge to
rapid development of GIS for use in community-based organizations. The
situation raises questions about whether the analyses and display of spatial
data influences how communities digest and interpret information about local
resources to reach decisions about land use. An investigation into how GIS
contributes to conflict management is therefore critical at this period of
rapid expansion in the implementation of GIS projects in resource management
institutions in local communities. This study could highlight the strengths
and/or limitations of GIS applications in conflict management and create an
opportunity for fruitful discussions about the future of Community-based GIS
applications.
Values, Interests, and Conflict
Management.
A conflict is a disagreement that
ensues from incompatible interests, values or actions between individuals,
groups, organizations or nations (Deutsh 1977; Gray 1989; Moore 1996; Susskind and Field 1996). The incompatible elements can occur
within individuals, between groups or inside nations. The disagreement can also
occur in a cooperative or a competitive context[2] such
as when incompatible interests or values[3]
develop between two or more persons, groups or nations. The interests that
sustain a conflict are generally reflected in the needs, desires, concerns, and
even fears that underlie the positions parties take in a dispute (Coser 1967;
Deutsch 1973; Susskind 1999; Moore 1996). For
example, when a group protests against logging, several interests will be at
the core of their position. Such interests might include a concern for land
degradation, desire to preserve wild life and protect local resources. Unlike
interests, values are types of beliefs that dictate standards which guide human
action in society and serve also as the basis for judgment, opinion and
behavior (Forrester 1987; Northrup 1989; Moore 1996; Susskind and Field 1996). Values refer issues such as the
sacredness of land or the sanctity of human life. Interests are about what
people want (e.g. material goods), but values relate to what they care most
about (e.g. human life, religious beliefs) (Northrup,
1989; Forrester, 1999; Susskind, 1999). In view of
the fact that values are inherently personal and subjective, they are believed
to be difficult to change by persuasive arguments. This belief seems to have generated
skepticism about the potential of dealing with conflicts in values. Value
differences are serious, but Forrester (1999) contends that the rhetoric about
deep fundamental differences makes it less possible that mediators will even
attempt to reconcile conflicting values. The author explains:
…the more we mystify value differences as ultimate
personal, subjective, irrational, or spiritual, the more we pull the wool over
our own eyes and simply fail to appreciate or understand those differences. The
more we presume that values are so subjective that they are virtually undiscussable, the less likely we will even try to discuss
them. The more our own rhetoric of “deep” and “fundamental” value differences
presumes unbridgeable chasms between those who hold differing values, the more
likely we will be to wring our hands and the less likely we will be to look for
practical ways to live together, honoring rather than fearing, shunning, or
obfuscating our real value differences”. (Forrester, 1999, 464).
Continuing, Forrester explains that
public skepticism feeds into the belief that parties who agree to negotiate
over values open themselves up to be pressured to compromise their principles
and betray their commitments. Under such conditions, he argued, “the neutrality
of mediators”, or their strategies are doubted because consensus is viewed as
“induced betrayal” (Forrester, 1999, 466). Consequently, when values are at
stake, a GIS application might not begin with public confidence but amidst
suspicion and skepticism. The point here is that value irreconcilability can be
real, but as Forrester (1999,) has explained, such a conclusion must be
discovered through real mediating efforts and not be based on presumptions. In
the section that follows, I discuss theories that form the basis of contradictory
claims about GIS applications in conflict management.
Max Weber on
Instrumental Rational Behavior and Conflict Resolution.
Writing about
instrumental rational behavior, Max Weber (1968) argued that society is
composed of multiple, competing, and often irreconcilable values that cannot be
rationally grounded. Weber challenged claims about objective reality on which
parties in a conflict reach agreements over conflicts in values. He explained
that competition and conflict occur in the sphere of power and not of reason
and as such the legitimacy of a claim does not lie in a rational justification,
but a de facto acceptance of an order of authority (p, 247). According to
Weber, rational arguments might succeed in eliminate superstitions, errors, and
prejudices but cannot replace traditional religious beliefs and values that
form the basis of individual behavior. He maintained that rational exchange is
possible when individuals are expected to benefit from it or when they are
compelled to do so by some “recognized economic power” (p.246). Weber,
distinguished a value-rational action from affectual behavior. He described affectual
behavior as desires, intentions and interests determined by an individual’s
specific affects and emotions. Continuing, Weber declared that affectual
behavior is tied to language and culture and is therefore inherently
susceptible of “interpretative discussion and change” (p32). On the contrary,
he described value-rational actions as behavior that are rooted in strongly
held beliefs, moral, and ethical principles that cannot be easily reconciled
(p.31-32). He therefore concluded that arguments based on values are “ends
rational” because people cannot be swayed from such beliefs (p.246).
Drawing inferences from
Weber’s argument, Obermeyer and Pinto (1994, 169-181) observed that disputes
over land use are sustained by value conflicts which generate emotions that are
not easily influenced by objective analysis of spatial data. The authors
explained that if parties to a conflict were presented with the same data, they
would often interpret it and reach different conclusions. The different spins
that opposing parties put on research findings in support of their long-held
beliefs is said to be a manifestation of the varying interpretations of data.
Accordingly, the authors concluded: “all forms of data are only as useful as
their interpretation” (p. 179) and as a result increased availability of geographic
data would elevate rather than lower the level of a dispute. Ultimately, they
argued, the conflict will level off but at a higher level of intensity than
previously existed (p.180).
Some Omissions in Weber’s Explanation
of Instrumental Rational Behavior.
Weber’s explanation of
instrumental rational behavior and how it relates to the resolution of conflicts
in society is for most part clear and convincing. Some of the persuasive
arguments include: 1) analysis of the role of emotion in human behavior
including the distinction between spontaneous emotion that short-circuits
rationality and more durable emotions that can harness instrumental
rationality. 2) discussion of ways by which human behavior can be guided by a)
adherence to a value, b) anticipation of disapproval caused by deviation from
social norms, and c) anticipation of practical inconvenience caused by
deviating from social norms, and finally, 3) recognition of the role of
emotions, notably shame, as a regulating social norm. However, Weber’s ideas
are set in a specific historical time frame and a context that involves
experiences other than what we know today. First, Elster
(2000) has argued that Weber does not integrate his analysis of rational action
with the analysis of rational belief formation and information acquisition.
Weber did not explicitly confront the issue that since the rationality of a
behavior depends upon the soundness of the beliefs upon which the action is
based, a theory of rational behavior must necessarily include “a theory of
rational belief formation and of optimal information acquisition” (Elster 2000, 39). If belief-formation requires information
acquisition (which I will argue it does), then innovative applications of GIS
might be able to influence decisions that are based on those beliefs. This
aside, Elster (2000) has criticized Weber on the
grounds that he did not explain whether the cognitive assumption that underlies
a rational behavior is rational or irrational. According to Mackie (1996), when
parties become involved in a conflict, they often find themselves in a belief
trap which they cannot revise because of the belief that the cost of testing
the belief or reversing it would be too high. From that standpoint, Mackie
explains, the false belief becomes rational and would then be used to encourage
behavior that prolongs the value-rational conflict. Thus, an individual’s
behavior may not always be prompted by instrumental rationality and self
interest.
Second, Weber seems to
substitute a customary behavior with a tradition when he defined the latter as
an “almost automatic reaction to habitual stimuli which guides behavior in a
course which has been repeatedly followed” (p.26). Weber’s neglect of the
impact of social institutions on an individual’s rational behavior is reflected
in his explanation of how convention transforms custom into a tradition. He
argued that: “it is by way of conventional rules that merely factual
irregularities of action (i.e., customs) are frequently transformed into
binding norms guaranteed primarily by psychological coercion (p.29). It is
Weber’s belief that “custom is devoid of any external sanction…conformity with
it is not demanded by anybody” (p.29). On the contrary, Weber acknowledges that
social sanctions could influence human behavior. He contended that an
individual who does not adapt to a custom is subject to social control
mechanisms including: 1) both petty and major inconveniences and 2) annoyances
(p.30). In fact, what Weber calls conventions are what modern sociologists
describe as norms that guide, control, and regulate acceptable behavior in a
society. We are aware today that customs differ from conventions because any
deviation from customs triggers expressions of disapproval and sanctions rather
than inconveniences and annoyances. If conventions and traditions are
maintained by disapproval of practical inconveniences because of deviation,
then it can be expected that those same behavior control mechanisms will be
assimilated into instrumental rationality. The sanctions can then become the
source of pressure that will influence an individual’s behavior during a
conflict.
Third, Weber claimed that
“action is affectual if it satisfies a need for revenge, sensual gratification,
devotion, contemplative bliss or for working off emotional tensions” (p.25). He
maintained that affectual behavior and a value-rational action have a common element
because the meaning of any such actions do not lie in the achievement of a
result ulterior to it, but “in carrying out the action for its own sake”
(p.25). In spite of this, Weber distinguished a value-rational action from an
affectual behavior by claiming that the former is exemplified by its “clearly
self-conscious formulation of the ultimate values governing action and the
consistently planned orientation of its detailed course to these values”
(p.25). It is necessarily to point out that while the emotional (affectual)
person may ignore the cost of a risky action in the passion of the moment, the
value-rational person may be fully aware of the cost and consequences but might
not let them affect his decision. Besides, some actions such as revenge contain
elements of both affectual and value rationality. Consider the case of an
individual who is angry and seeks retaliation. For such an aggrieved person, an
emotionally charged revenge behavior is affectual but such an action is often
carried out with great tactical and strategic skill and hence instrumental
rational as well. Consequently, an individual’s behavior in a value-rational
conflict may not depend entirely on instrumental rationality but can be
determined by several factors including self-interest, group expectations and
tactical considerations.
Finally, in Weber’s
arguments and indeed in many of the inferences that ensue from his explanation,
attempts are made to pull apart the desires and beliefs that sustain a
conflict. However, several social actions are prompted not by independent
psychological elements but a combination of affective, cognitive and
value-rational mechanisms (Rachel 1975). It would be unusual (although not
impossible) to find concrete cases of social action that were oriented entirely
in one of affective, cognitive or value rational domains. For example, among
the Akans of Southern Ghana among whom the case study
explained later in this article was conducted, a forest is an abode for spirits
and ancestors that protect the communities (Rattray
1923; Pugocki 1968; Agyeman
1993). However, the forest also contains economic trees and other non-timber
products that provide the basis of economic activity for the people. Among the Akans therefore, both the economic interests in resource
use and beliefs about the sanctity of a forest converge on the exploitation of
resources. Conflicts arising from competition for access to local forest
resources are therefore conflicts over interests (economic) as well as values
(sanctity of land). With such collusion between interests and values, it will
not be surprising that disputants will not always be clear about specific
psychological elements that sustain a conflict. In fact, Northrup,
(1989) has observed that often in conflicts over values, original causes become
entangled with derivative issues that are not directly connected to the issue
that caused the conflict. It may therefore be possible to use a strategy that
can help stakeholders to avoid the distraction of derivative issues and focus
attention on actual causes of the conflict to prepare disputants for the resolution
of value conflicts.
Habermas’ Communication Theory and
Conflict Resolution.
Unlike Weber who believed
the move to reach agreements in a conflict is motivated by self-interests,
Habermas argued that cooperation is an important goal among rational
individuals in a society. In his thesis on communicative action, Habermas
(1984, 1987) viewed society as a self-regulating system in which human actions
are coordinated through functional interconnections geared at maintaining order
and harmony. He explained that rational and goal-directed individuals use
communication to effectively engage in cooperative processes. According to
Habermas:
“It is possible to reach agreement about disputed
claims by way of argument and insight and without recourse to force other than
that of reasons and grounds [that provide] a reflexive medium for dealing with
problematic validity claims” (Habermas 1984, 17).
Habermas saw communication as an
effective tool in conflict management because, according to him, the process
allows disputants to incorporate their opponents’ interpretation of the conflict
into their own in such a way that “the divergent situation definitions can be
brought to coincide sufficiently” (Habermas 1984, 100). According to Habermas,
such discussions do not occur without reference to the underlying values
because one cannot understand an opponent’s response or claim if he or she is
not aware of the reasons why the opponent is making those claims. However, by
following the deliberations and responding to claims, the individual becomes
involved in the process (p.115-116). Accordingly, Habermas argued that because
validity claims (reasons and grounds) can be criticized and defended, there is
the possibility that disputants can identify and correct their mistakes and
misunderstandings and learn from them to facilitate consensus building
(Habermas 1984, 17). By choosing communication as the medium for coordinating
actions that would lead to agreements, Habermas recognized language and other
instruments of communication (including GIS) as critical for managing conflicts.
We note in this regard that GIS has been adopted to facilitate communication
between groups and integrate multiple perspectives and interests in land use (Sedogo and Groten 2000; Carver 1991; Eastman et. al. 1993a,
1993b; Harris et. al. 1995). It
follows from the above discussion that although the drive to claim rewards
influences disputants’ behavior in a conflict, social institutions (i.e.,
commitments and group expectations) also affect their attitudes in disputes. It
was for this reason that Zartman (2000) argued that even if we discount the
claim that social harmonization is a common characteristic of traditional
societies (Gluckman 1965; Bates 1983; Rose 1992), or
the broader sociological thesis that social equilibrium is a universal
characteristic of human societies (Parsons 1937), the fact remains that all
human societies develop mechanisms to deal with conflict. The conflict mechanisms
which range from shared values, norms and group expectations to sanctions
imposed by formal social institutions (i.e. courts) are used to monitor human
behavior and punish deviation. Gluckman (1956, 1965),
and other scholars (Boahen 1973; Bozeman 1976; Kouassi 2000; Uwazie, 2000) have
reported that conflict prevention and peace preservation efforts in many
societies are interlaced with social relations including marriage and common
membership of ethnic groups, businesses and professional associations. For
example, among the Akans of Ghana and the Yoruba of
Nigeria, marriage is not only a union between a man, a woman and their
respective extended families, but the union is also conceived as a cooperative
venture that fosters inter-group relations between communities (Rattray, 1936; Gluckman, 1956; Kouassi 2000; Uwazie, 2000). The
authors further explain that traditional rulers in the region use their common
membership of clans and extended family ties to build relationships that
transcend conflicts (Boahen 1973; Kouassi
2000). Thus, when relationships are enduring, conflicting parties come under
pressure to suppress their self interests and find ways to live together.
Consequently, if the GIS application appeals to values that are shared between
disputants, it might be possible to alter adversarial relationships by
validating the core identity of both parties. For example, by using a GIS to
illustrate how a forest resource (i.e., timber) that is a source of conflict
could be jeopardized (i.e., by wildfire, poachers etc.) by a prolonged
conflict, a GIS expert might draw disputants closer together to think about
creating joint gains that protect the timber resource in question. On the other
hand, Uwazie (2000), has observed that even in societies
where the tendency to seek cooperation in conflicts is very strong, individuals
and social groups occasionally sacrifice long-term relationships and take
extreme measures (i.e., summons in official courts) to compete for, or protect
scarce resources. A case in point is the internal conflict that recently led to
the destruction of human lives and property in
A Perspective on Conflict Resolution and GIS Applications
It is important to note
that none of the two theories that currently support the main approaches to
conflict resolution provides a complete account of the mediation process. For
example, Webers’ explanation of instrumental
rationality emphasizes benefits to individuals but assumes away the influence
of social institutions without which the rewards to individuals might not
materialize. Weber also failed to realize how disputants can reach tactical agreements
to avoid a conflict while also retaining some independent gains. His attempt to
explain all social phenomena (including conflict resolution) in terms of
rational behavior and self-interest removes any role for group expectations,
relationships, and sanctions in mitigating cases to facilitate conflict
resolution. There are circumstances (particularly, when the parties are
involved in several mutual interactions) in which groups may find it necessary
to make adjustments in their values to maintain a long-term relationship. It is
often the case in mediation that an attempt to claim values and self-interest
while ignoring the need to create joint gains lead to undesirable outcomes. In
a similar way, Habermas communication theory acknowledges the rationality of
individuals and the potential for pursuing self-interests but emphasizes
collective action as the force behind social cohesion and harmony. Habermas also
failed to anticipate a situation where intense competition resulting from
scarcity of resources could compel rational beings to focus entirely on their own
means of survival and hence pursue their self interests. Given that individuals
in a society do not have all the resources they need, and because resources are
essential to human survival, there will always be some competition for existing
resources. In competing for scarce resources, individuals and groups are often
concerned with their own survival and as such their actions are prompted more by
self-interest than the overall interest of society. It is necessary to point
out that intense competition can create motives for strategic cooperation
between disputants. For example, escalation in competition for scarce forest resources
can exacerbate environmental turbulence and raise the level of risk in such a
way that it that can be offset only by a negotiated agreement that minimizes
self-interests (Gray 1989). Thus, although the need to protect relationships by
cooperating to create joint values can be very strong among disputants in a
sociopolitical system, there are instances where competition drives individuals
to engage in actions with the sole aim of protecting their self-interests.
It is clear from the
above discussion that the cooperative and competitive elements of a conflict are
inextricably intertwined. It is therefore necessary for mediators to recognize
the dual forces that drive the process. When conflict resolution is seen in
this light, communication between disputants and hence, GIS applications become
necessary for negotiating joint values and facilitating the formation of
strategic alliances that would lead help resolve disagreements. Under this
perspective, GIS can be utilized to explore the expectations and fears of
disputants (i.e. maps showing threats - fire, poaching, floods etc., - to a
resource in dispute) and emphasize their shared values and interests (map
locations of resources that are in dispute and show the spatial relationships
between such features). Applications of the technology can focus on the impact
of each party’s demand on the other (i.e., produce a conflict map) and the design
of different scenarios for allocating the resource in question between
disputants (by changing variables that constitute the maps). It might be
possible through such creative GIS applications to get the parties to agree on
compromises that might resolve the conflict between them.
Types of Conflict and GIS
Applications in Mediation.
I have argued elsewhere that
values can be altered but it needs to be emphasized that the inflexibility of
values that sustain a conflict depends upon several factors including whether
the disagreement occurs within or between sociopolitical systems. One cannot
fully understand a conflict situation or deal effectively with it without
understanding the context within which the conflict occurs. This is because the
context provides knowledge that imbues human action with a meaning. It also
provides background experiences upon which disputants evaluate their situations
and decide to either curtail or prolong a conflict. A richer understanding of
GIS role in conflict management therefore requires familiarity with the type of
conflict, whether the disagreement occurs between parties located within the
same or different sociopolitical systems.
Between-System Conflicts
According to Zartman (2000, 7-9), between-system
conflicts are disagreements that occur between individuals, organizations or
subgroups located in separate sociopolitical systems (figure 1a). The entities
share little or no values in common and may not be engaged in intimate and
long-term relationships. As a result, they may be less obliged to work towards
the resolution of conflicts between them. Prolonging a conflict could even be a
way of ascertaining the relative strengths of their antagonistic values. Accordingly,
the competitive urge to protect independent values makes such between-system
conflicts more difficult to resolve than conflicts that occur between parties
within a sociopolitical system. This, and the fact that several between-system
conflicts occur over non-spatial issues (i.e. negotiating rights) renders GIS applications
a poor setting for reconciling such contradictions. In disputes over forests,
oceans, air and space, disagreements arise mainly from the negotiation of
rights to such resources. Between-system conflicts therefore require
negotiation rather than mediation to resolve (Mastenbroek
1989; Druckman 1997). In contrast, conflicts between
individuals and groups within a socio-political system (within-system conflicts) occur amidst a constellation of
relationships and group expectations. This type of conflict (illustrated in
figure 1b) pits individuals, groups or organizations within a community against
each other. Within-system conflicts, such as what occurs among groups competing
for scarce local resources, strains relationships within a community. Resolution
of the conflict restores relationships and reinforces harmony and unity amongst
the people. Conflict management strategies (including GIS) can therefore take
advantage of referents in values and binding relationships to induce
compliance, cooperation or consensus by essentially calling the parties to
order to preserve relationships and the community (Boahen,
1973; Zartman 2000; Osaghae 2000; Koassi, 2000).
Accordingly, several community-based GIS projects have been implemented in within-system
conflicts context. For example, in South Africa, an integrative PGIS project
involving the use of interviews, participatory workshops, transect walks and
Global Positioning System (GPS) boundary identification, has been conducted to incorporate local knowledge and integrate
multiple and competing perspectives into land reforms that is occurring in the
former apartheid state (Harris and Weiner, 1995, 1998, 2002). In another
African example, Sedogo and Groten
(2000) combined participatory methods with GIS to transform competing
perspectives and conflicting interests of local groups in a Burkinabe village
into a plan for managing local resources. In the cases above, GIS applications
were essential in getting the parties to understand their problems, explore
alternative solutions and to work together to create joint gains.
Within-System Conflicts
In the within-system
conflicts category, some disagreements do not pose a direct threat to
authority. Such inter-group conflicts
(depicted in figure 2a) result from competition for scarce local resources,
power or recognition between individuals or groups located within a
sociopolitical system. There are however some grievances within society that
pitch individuals or groups against the status quo. These against-system conflicts (figure 2b) occur between groups in a
community against part or the complete sociopolitical structure (Zartman 2000).
Of the two internal cases of disagreement, against-system conflicts are often
viewed to be difficult to resolve because of the imbalances of power and
resources between groups and the overall political authority. Notwithstanding
this expectation, a large number of reported community-based GIS applications
occur in against-system contexts. For example, GIS has been adopted to assist some
Native American Indians of North America prepare counter claims to their
territories and ancestral lands (Beltgens 1995; Smith
1995) and to facilitate bottom-up transformation of existing political
structures and public discourse (Arvello-Jimenez and Conn 1995; Forbes 1995). GIS is also the tool of choice for
activism organized at local, national and global scales (Sieber
2002; Tulloch 2002, Stonich 2002). Reporting on a
case that is imbued with all the characteristics of against-system conflicts,
Harwell (2000) revealed that in the aftermath of a 1998 forest fire in
The type of conflict aside, GIS’s
role in conflict management ensues from the impact that the applications exert
on belief formation. The basic structure of an individual’s belief formation
and the role GIS can play in the process is presented in Figure 3. The model
rests on the assumptions that; 1) an individual’s action or behavior is
rational for it best satisfies his or her desires and beliefs and 2) the belief
itself is grounded in information. As explained earlier, an individual’s
rational behavior depends upon the clarity of the beliefs from which the
actions are derived. There are occasions when gathering too much information
before reaching a decision can be dangerous (e.g. a rescuer requesting detailed
description of a drowning boy before embarking on the mission to save him) but
it would be irrational not to invest in any information before deciding on an
issue that is of utmost interest to oneself (e.g. buying a house). A rational
belief formation therefore depends on information acquisition (Elster 2000). In figure 3, the information requirement for
belief formation is fulfilled by GIS. It can be inferred from the figure that the
production and analysis of data which relates directly to some value or
interest could exert an influence on the belief itself. For example, if a GIS
application reveals conditions that affect the physical and ideologically
determined comfort and safety levels of stakeholders, (as conditioned by regular
consumption of a resource that is now in dispute), the parties would respond to
the situation in an attempt to protect or maintain their levels of consumption and
welfare. Again, stakeholders would respond if through effective data analyses,
the GIS expert convinces them that a desired response might jeopardize their
interests or enhance their fundamental values. In these cases, the GIS
application would become the source of motivation for the change in
stakeholders’ positions.
Again, as the illustration shows,
beliefs and desires (or values and interests) embody behavioral elements
because they lead to action when we activate them. According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), values provide guides to the formation
of beliefs and desires that are then expressed externally as opinions, behavior
and actions. Values arise from the resolution of the challenges presented to a
group by their unique and particular situations (Freud 1964). As well, they
serve as guides to human attitudes which Rockeah
(1975,175) describes as “the enduring organizations of beliefs around an object
or situation that predisposes an individual to respond in some preferential way”.
The attitudes that emanate from a value attempt to render the world more
comprehensible and psychically comfortable for the individual (ibid).
Consequently, a group might hold on to their values, or find ways to
rationalize and justify them so they would feel secured and comfortable in
their decisions and actions (Rockeah 1975; Fishbein & Ajzen 1975). But
do values that underlie an individual’s behavior in a conflict undergo changes?
I believe they do because compelling situations (i.e. wars, natural
catastrophes or even persistent mistakes) often challenge individuals and
society in general to re-evaluate their views and update their values and
beliefs accordingly. Attitudes maintain strong links with human actions because
they create a state of mind that propels individuals to
move beyond a belief that a goal or an object is desirable, into active
engagement of the mind to respond to that object to achieve the perceived goal
(Rockeah 1975). For example, expressed opinions are
overt behaviors that reflect an individual’s attitudes (Smith 1975) and hence
the values they hold and treasure. As shown in the figure, an opinion is the
bridge between the personal world of beliefs and desires and the external world
of behavior and actions. An opinion therefore provides a window to the core of
an individual’s beliefs and desires (or values and interests). Consider a
mediation process where parties represent the objects in dispute on maps or
speak about the objects contained in GIS maps prepared for the discussions. In
this instance, the parties will be making decisions that will be influenced by
values which dictated their positions in the conflict. Questioning stakeholders’
opinions about conditions represented in the maps therefore taps into their
beliefs and can consequently reveal the values underlying the positions they have
taken. By engaging disputants in such open discussions of issues that sustain a
conflict, a GIS expert might succeed in revealing the real motives that drive
the dispute. The information could then be utilized to design applications that
would help the parties understand the conflict in new ways and prepare them for
consensus building. In the remainder of the article, I describe how GIS was
adopted to facilitate the management of an inter-group conflict between parties
competing for access to local forest resources in a community in
Background to the Conflict:
Whilst
implementing PGIS projects in
· Meetings were held with the parties to understand
their concerns and learn about their demands. Those participants who sought to
preserve the remainig forest and thereby protect some resources requested about
400 hectares of the 4,566 hectare forest while the loggers requested 350
hectares.
· The two parties were assisted to identify relevant
criteria (continuous factors and
constraints) that were later used to determine the suitability of each party’s
demand (objective).
· The factors were scaled to a standardized range
(0-255) to allow for their comparison and a set of weights was developed to
express the relative importance of the factors to the objectives under
consideration.
· The criteria were then combined by means of a weighted
linear combination method (Voogd 1983) and subsequently masked by each of the
boolean constraints in turn using an MCE module in the Idrisi for Windows GIS
used for the study. This resulted in separate suitability maps for both logging
and preservation.
· Thereafter, each suitability map was ranked and a
quantity of the top ranked cells were selected to meet areal targets demanded
by the parties.
Exploring
Values, Interests and Spatial Dimensions of the Conflict.
The zone of maximum
suitability in both maps converged at the southwestern portion of the forest.
The suitability maps thus illustrated the conflicting nature of the groups’
demands. Explaining such a conflict, Eastman and others (1993a) have assumed a
decision space where two objectives form opposite axes. This allows for
criterion scores in the two suitability maps to be allocated according to their
objective scales (0-255). Dividing up the decision space among the two
objectives is equivalent to moving a perpendicular decision line down from the
position of maximum suitability until enough cells are captured to make up the
areal goals for each objective. With two objectives (logging and preservation),
the decision lines clearly delineate four regions as shown in Figure 4. These
include:
1. an area selected for objective 1 (logging) only and
hence non-conflicting.
2. an area selected for objective 2 only (preservation)
and hence non-conflicting.
3. a sizeable area not selected for either logging or
preservation (unsuitable choices), and
4. an area selected by both objectives 1 and 2 and hence
in dispute (conflict zone).
Based on the above
illustration, we cross-classified the two ranked suitability maps of the Aboma
Forest to create a conflict map (shown in Figure 5 in which areas in the forest
that were not in dispute were separated from those areas that were jointly
demanded by both parties. The map also revealed a large portion of the forest
that was either out of the competition loop or unsuitable for the the
activities under consideration and as such not vital to the dispute. The
interests of the parties overlapped at the southwest where timber, as well as
many non-timber forest products had been protected from the annual wildfire
that had destroyed much of the
Discussion
of Results.
The Ghanaian case study and others
reviewed in this article reveal that GIS applications in conflict mediation
occur amidst a complex set of contextual factors. Some of the contextual factors are competitive in nature while others
are rooted in institutions including norms, sanctions and customary practices
in society.
Competitive Forces.
Competitive forces that are derived from self-interest behavior of stakeholders tend to foster a zero-sum game which leads to individual advantage in a conflict (Rubin and Brown 1975). However, competition can either become a driving or a restraining force in conflict resolution (Whetten 1981; Gray 1985). For example, in cases such as the conflict at Kofiase which involved competition for scarce forest resources, or in conflicts that involve resources which are deemed to be of very high value (i.e., diamonds, gold etc.,), collaboration is difficult to attain even among members of a close-knit family (Whetten and Gray 1984). Yet, competition can facilitate cooperation such as when disputants find a need to resolve a conflict for the sole tactical reason of dealing with a common threat. For example, at some point during the Kofiase project, the two parties realized that prolonging the conflict could cause them to lose the forest resources that sustained the conflict to wildfire